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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The issues are outlined in Plaintiff's and Defendant's 
briefs. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant disagrees with several of Plaintiff's allegations 
of fact. Plaintiff states that, "There is no evidence that the 
truck was on the Reservation when Chrysler Credit repossessed 
the truck". That is not true because Defendant clearly testi-
fied that the truck was on the Reservation when it was repos-
sessed. (TR p. 51). Plaintiff did not object to that testimony 
and did not offer any evidence to contradict it. 
Plaintiff also offers as a fact that Plaintiff repaired the 
vehicle prior to sale. That is also completely untrue. Plain-
tiff clearly testified that the vehicle was sold "as is" and 
that it was not detailed (TR p.33) and that Plaintiff did not 
try to improve the vehicle prior to sale. (TR p. 41) 
Plaintiff states that the vehicle was placed in the car lot 
for sale but fails to state that it was improperly offered for 
sale prior to sending any of the required notices to Defendant. 
(TR p. 28) 
Finally, Plaintiff states that the "vehicle was advertised 
and shown to prospective purchasers". However, Plaintiff also 
testified that the vehicle was "not in salable condition" (TR p. 
38). There was no evidence presented by Plaintiff that the 
vehicle was advertised for a public sale on a given date. There 
was no evidence as to the content of the alleged advertising 
other than that it was "advertised with 10 or 12 other used 
cars... and it was just placed there as another vehicle" with 
some unknown price on it. (TR p. 35). There was no evidence 
that Plaintiff used any reasonable efforts to attract a group of 
potential buyers to participate in a public sale of the vehicle. 
(TR pp. 34-36) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I. The burden of proof was on the Plaintiff to show 
that the truck was lawfully repossessed by his assignor under 
Navajo Tribal Law. Plaintiff failed to prove compliance with 
the law. 
POINT II. Whether the sale was "public" or "private", the 
Plaintiff has not met the burden of proving that "every aspect" 
of the sale was commercially reasonable. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE BURDEN OF PROOF WAS ON THE PLAINTIFF TO SHOW THAT 
THE TRUCK WAS LAWFULLY REPOSSESSED BY HIS ASSIGNOR 
UNDER NAVAJO TRIBAL LAW. PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PROVE 
COMPLIANCE WITH THE LAW. 
Defendant inadvertently failed to actually testify at trial 
that she was a Navajo Indian. However, there was ample circum-
stantial evidence to prove that fact. Defendant resided on the 
Navajo Reservation throughout the course of these proceedings. 
It was also apparent to anyone at trial that Defendant's physi-
cal appearance was adequate testimony that she is a Navajo 
Indian. It is important to note that at no point in the trial 
did Plaintiff ever question that Defendant was a Navajo Indian. 
To do so would have seemed ridiculous in light of Defendant's 
physical appearance. Whether Defendant was actually Navajo 
Indian or not should have no bearing on the result of the case 
since the interests sought to be protected by the applicable 
provisions of the Navajo Code would be equally impacted even if 
Defendant were not a Navajo Indian. That is, the maintenance of 
peace and order on the Reservation. There is no basis for 
Plaintiff's confusing argument that the Court cannot take 
judicial notice of the jurisdiction of a Court of the Navajo 
Nation within its territory. The Court needs only follow prior 
case law which establishes that the Navajo Indians were given 
power to exercise tribal self-government and promulgate regula-
tions for territorial management over Indians and non-Indians. 
Babbit Ford, Inc. v. Navajo Indian Tribe, 710 F.2d 587, 591-94 
(9th Cir. 1933). The United States Supreme Court adopted the 
view of the Senate Judiciary Committee that defined the parame-
ters of the right of the Indians to govern themselves when it 
explained that the Indian Tribes have "the right of self-govern-
ment and jurisdiction over the persons and property within the 
limits of the territory they occupy." Id,, at 593 (emphasis 
added) (quoted in Menion v, Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 
130, 140 (1981). Babbitt Ford and its precedents clearly 
establish that the Navajos have jurisdiction over their entire 
territory or reservation so that Plaintiff's assignor, Chrysler 
Credit, was bound to follow Navajo law. 
The truck was repossessed while in the possession of 
Defendant's brother-in-law, and Defendant's brother-in-law was 
living on the reservation. (TR 45-46). Defendant testified 
that the truck was repossessed from the Navajo Reservation. (TR 
51). Since the truck was on the Reservation, Chrysler Credit 
had to adhere to Navajo law. Plaintiff presented no evidence 
that assignor complied with the tribal law. 
Plaintiff argues that it should not be penalized for 
Chrysler Credit's illegal repossession because there was no 
agency relationship between them. Defendant agrees that there 
was no agency relationship between Plaintiff and Chrysler 
Credit. Defendant asserts that there is an assignment relation-
ship between Chrysler Credit Corporation and Plaintiff. Plain-
tiff was bound to accept the truck back when there was a payment 
default. (TR 7-8). On the final page of the Retail Installment 
Contract under the heading of "Assignment", Plaintiff agreed to 
buy back the truck in case of default. (Appellant's Brief, 
Addendum, A-6). Defendant believes that Plaintiff should be 
held to the specific words of the Contract and the Court should 
find that any defenses Defendant has against Chrysler Credit, 
the assignor, are also applicable against Plaintiff. 
There was no evidence presented by the Plaintiff that 
Chrysler Credit received the required consent under the Navajo 
Code by obtaining written consent from the Defendant, or a Court 
order from a Navajo Tribal Court. The burden of proof is on the 
Plaintiff, not the Defendant, to prove that its assignor com-
plied with the statute. Since the Plaintiff has not met the 
burden of proving that the repossession was valid, the Plain-
tiff, as assignee, should be barred from receiving any deficien-
cy judgment. 
POINT II . 
WHETHER THE SALE WAS "PUBLIC" OR "PRIVATE", THE PLAIN-
TIFF HAS NOT MET THE BURDEN OF PROVING THAT "EVERY 
ASPECT" OF THE SALE WAS COMMERCIALLY REASONABLE. 
Plaintiff argues that Defendant misunderstands the standard 
of review applicable to this case. Contrary to Plaintiff's 
arguments, Defendant merely asserts that the trial court abused 
its discretion by finding that Plaintiff has met its burden of 
proving that "every aspect of the disposition including the 
method, manner, time, place, and terms" were commercially 
reasonable. Pioneer Dodge Center, Inc. v. Glaubensklee, 649 
P.2d 28, 30 (Utah 1982). Defendant contends that Plaintiff has 
not and cannot prove that every aspect of the sale was commer-
cially reasonable. 
Defendant previously argued that Plaintiff made an unrea-
sonable private sale. Plaintiff now alleges in its brief that a 
public sale took place in this case, relying on the fact that 
the truck was advertised to the public and it was for sale on 
their lot. Defendant maintains that there was no public sale in 
this case. Utah Code Annotated § 70-9-504(3) leaves public sale 
and private sale undefined. However, the Utah Supreme Court has 
defined the boundaries of a public sale in Glaubensklee. The 
Court quoting from other sources, stated first that public sale 
has meant "a sale in which the public, upon proper notice, is 
invited to participate and given full opportunity to bid upon a 
competitive basis for the property placed on sale, which is sold 
to the highest bidder." Id., at 30 The Court quoted the 
Restatement of Security § 48 comment that a public sale is "one 
to which the public- is invited by advertisement to appear and 
bid at auction for the goods to be sold." Id. The Court also 
quoted Gilmorefs, view of a public sale which states: 
Presumably the essence of a ^public sale' is that the 
relevant public is not only invited to attend but is 
also informed, by whatever means of publicity may be 
appropriate, when and where the sale is to be held. If 
the sale has not been appropriately publicized, it 
would not be a public sale no matter where it was held 
or how it was conducted. 
Id. 
The notice to the Defendant of the sale did not state 
whether this was a public or a private sale. (Appellant's 
Brief, Addendum, A-7). The truck was allegedly advertised 
generally with 10 or 12 other used cars but there was no indica-
tion that the advertisement explained that this was a 
repossessed truck for sale on a specified date, at a specific 
time, at Plaintiff's place of business. The Plaintiff produced 
no advertisement for the Court to examine. (TR 34-36). There 
is no evidence that proves that the public was invited to a 
public auction to bid on a competitive basis for the truck'. The 
record is barren as to whether a public auction even took place 
and the burden is on the Plaintiff to prove that the advertise-
ments conformed to the Code, that there was an auction where 
competitive bidding took place, and that the public knew the 
date, time, and place of the auction. There were simply three 
private wholesale bids given in addition to Plaintiff's own bid. 
Public sale means that the public is involved and there is no 
evidence to show that the public met for an auction. Robert 
Davis, the manager of Davis Chrysler Dodge testified that when 
he bought the truck it was "very rough, dirty; it had a number 
of things that we had to repair to put it in salable condition." 
(TR 55). Therefore, even when the truck was alleged to be on 
Plaintiff's lot for "public sale" it was not in salable condi-
tion. It is of little surprise that no one from the public 
would want to buy it. There is nothing that Plaintiff has done 
to meet its burden of proof that this was a commercially reason-
able sale in all aspects. 
Whether the Court finds that this was a public sale or a 
private sale makes no difference to the Defendant because either 
way, the sale was commercially unreasonable. In the event that 
the Court finds that this was a private sale, Plaintiff violated 
the self-dealing prohibitions of the Code. Plaintiff cites no 
case law for the proposition that there is a recognized market 
for used cars, and that they are subject to widely distributed 
standard price quotations under the private sale self-dealing 
exceptions. Defendant stands by Community Management Ass!n of 
Colorado Springs v. Tousley, 505 P.2d 1314 (Colo. 1973) and 
Carter v. Rayburn Ford Sales, Inc., 451 S.W.2d 199 (Ark. 1970) 
for the proposition that automobiles do not come within either 
exception. 
Plaintiff cites no authority for the proposition that 
Courts have disagreed whether used cars can be sold to the 
secured party at a private sale. Defendant asserts that Vic 
Hanson & Sons v. Crowley, 57 Wis.2d 106, 203 N.W.2d 728 (1973) 
and Jackson State Bank v. Beck, 577 P.2d (Wyo. 1978) are prece-
dent that self-dealing at a private sale is commercially unrea-
sonable. If the Court held that this was a private sale, it was 
commercially unreasonable because of the violation of the Navajo 
Tribal Code, only three bids were solicited, the advertising was 
inadequate, notice was faulty, there was self-dealing when one 
family own€>d business sold the truck to another business owned 
by the same family, and it was sold at wholesale rather than 
retail. 
If the Court finds as the Plaintiff desires, that this was 
a public sale, it was commercially unreasonable because the 
public was not informed of the time, date, and place of the 
sale, there was no auction where the public could competitively 
bid, no public bids were solicited, and the truck was not even 
in salable condition. 
Since the facts indicate that Plaintiff did not even make 
as much effort as the seller who had his deficiency barred in 
Glaubensklee/ to ensure that the sale was commercially reason-
able, the trial court clearly abused its discretion by failing 
to bar Plaintiff's judgment. In Glaubensklee, the Court stated: 
The only efforts to obtain buyers consisted of taking 
the truck to a few lots and obtaining oral bids of 
undisclosed amounts; placing the truck on the sales lot 
for a few days; and announcing the sale over the 
loudspeaker immediately prior thereto* These efforts 
did not give reasonable notice to that part of the 
public which would likely be interested in the sale. 
Id., at 31. 
At least in Glaubensklee, there was notice to the public 
over the loudspeaker. Plaintiff did not even make that much 
effort. Plaintiff's deficiency judgment should be barred 
because it remains that every aspect of the disposition of the 
truck in this case was not commercially reasonable. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant therefore requests that the Judgment of the 
Circuit Court be reversed, barring Plaintiff's deficiency 
judgment because of Plaintiff's violations of the Utah Uniform 
Commercial Code and/or allowing a $2,186.75 offset for viola-
tions of the Navajo Tribal Code. 
Respectfully submitted this ?S* day of November, 1988. 
RICHARD A. HUMMEL 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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